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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction exists over this matter pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of 
the Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure and Section 78-2a-3(h) U.C.A. 
(1953), as amended. This is an appeal from an Amended Judgment 
& Order entered June 13, 2000, granting the Respondent's Objection 
To Commissioner's Recommendation entered on September 30, 
1998. The Petitioner's Notice Of Appeal was filed on July 7, 2000. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the District Court erred by rejecting the 
Commissioner's recommended Judgment & Order granting the 
Petitioner's Motion For Judgment. This issue is reviewed for 
correctness and given no deference on appeal. Dent v. Dent, 870 
P.2d 280, 282 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). This issue was briefed and 
preserved before both the Commissioner and the District Court. (R. 
486, 527, and 534). 
2. Whether the District Court erred by holding that the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel was applicable in cases where a valid 
child support order existed. This is a question that this Court reviews 
Thompson Appellate Brief *** page 1 
for correctness. Dent v. Dent. 870 P.2d 280, 282 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). This issue was briefed and preserved before both the 
Commissioner and the District Court. (R. 486, 527, and 534). 
3. Whether the District Court erred in finding that the 
Respondent proved the elements of equitable estoppel assuming the 
doctrine was applicable. The question of whether equitable estoppel 
was proved is a mixed question of fact and law. State Department Of 
Human Services v. Irizarrv, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (1997). This issue was 
briefed and preserved before both the Commissioner and the District 
Court. (R. 486, 527, and 534). 
4. Whether the District Court erred in calculating the 
judgment due Petitioner assuming the doctrine of equitable estoppel 
was applicable and the Respondent proved its elements. The 
question of whether equitable estoppel was proved is a mixed 
question of fact and law. State Department Of Human Services v. 
Irizarrv, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (1997). This issue was preserved before 
the District Court. (R. 560, 566, 577, 580, 568). 
5. Is the Petitioner entitled to additional fees and costs 
incurred below after the Respondent objected to the Commissioner's 
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recommendation n i< 1 MititlPil In .illuini^ , le« •. ,ii •• I •«isls uii.ii ipt.il ' 
This issue is a question of law for the Appellate Court to consider. 
Childs v. Childs. 867 P.2d 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert. den. 982 
P.2d 88 (1999). The issue of attorney's fees for legal work before the 
Trial Court was briefed and preserved before the Commissioner and 
IIif Distncl COII I I <K <JHh, V / , Mini S,^l). 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OR CENTRAL TO THE APPEAL 
Section 30-3-10- provides: 
"(1) Each payment or installment of child or spousal support 
under any child support order, as defined by Section 62A-11-
401, is, on and after the date it is due: 
(a) a judgment with the same attributes and effect of 
any judgment of a district court, except as provided 
in Subsection (2); 
(b) entitled, as a judgment, to full faith and credit in this 
and any other jurisdiction; and 
not subject to retroactive modification by this or any 
other jurisdiction, except as provided in Subsection (2) 
(2) A child or spousal support payment under a child support 
order may be modified with respect to any period during which a 
petition for modification is pending, but only from the date notice of 
that petition was given to the obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, 
or to the obligor, if the obligee is the petitioner. 
l:or purposes of this section, 'jurisdiction' means a state or 
political subdivision, a territory or possession of the United States, 
Th.-n K" " ** page 3 
the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(4) The judgment provided in Subsection (1)(a), to be effective 
and enforceable as a lien against the real property interest of any 
third party relying on the public record, shall be docketed in the 
district court in accordance with Sections 78-22-1 and 62A-11-
312.5" 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case. This is an action seeking recovery of past 
due child support for two children, Kelly and Gentry, and attorney's 
fees under a decree of divorce entered on March 8,1982. The 
Petitioner had actual custody of both children until April 1992, when 
Gentry started living with the Respondent. Kelly turned 18 on April 19, 
1996 and graduated in June, 1996. Gentry turned 18 on November 24, 
1997. 
Course Of Proceedings. The Petitioner filed a Motion and 
Order to Show Cause on August 8,1996, seeking a judgment for past 
due child support and attorney's fees pursuant to a Decree Of Divorce 
entered on March 8,1982. (R. 402). The Respondent responded by 
denying he was in arrears and asserted the defenses of laches, 
waiver, and estoppel. (R. 412). 
Thompson Appellate Brief *** page 4 
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Decree seeking to obtain custody of Gentry, who then resided with 
him, and corresponding child support. (R. 415). The Petition was 
served on the Petitioner on November 11, 1996. (R. 420). 
Both matters were certified by Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett 
evidentiary hi.il MM llii i nilH'i ,'«i I1'1' i l1 'UMI 'hi June24, 
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matters back for a recommended decision by the Commissioner with 
instructions that the parties proceed by submitting affidavits and 
supporting memoranda. 
On July 23, 1998, the Petitioner filed a Motion For Judgment 
along with supporting affidavits and memoranda. (R. 484, 486, 502, 
507, and 511). The Motion sought the sum of $24,896.34 for child 
supp arages 
attorney's fees and costs. Commission Thomas N. Arnett heard the 
Petitioner's Motion For Judgment on September 18, 1998. 
Commissioner Arnett recommended that the Petitioner's Motion For 
Judgment be granted and recommended that she be awarded 
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judgment for $24,896.34 in arrearages, $2,552.88 in attorney's fees, 
and $68.92 in costs. (R. 545). 
The Respondent objected to Commissioner Arnett's 
recommendation on September 30, 1998. (R.527). The Respondent 
objected to that portion of the judgment that included child support for 
Gentry while residing with the Respondent. ]g\ He claimed that 
Commissioner Arnett should have applied the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel for the period he had Gentry. He requested that "the matter 
be returned to the Commissioner for an evidentiary hearing whether 
Respondent meets the factual criteria for equitable estoppel." (R. 
531). 
The District Court heard the Respondent's objection on 
November 6,1998. The minute entry reflects, "The objection to the 
recommendation is argued before the court and the same is 
submitted. The court find (sic) that the objection is well taken and 
grants the same." (R. 552). On February 9,1999, the Court entered 
an order setting aside the judgment and entered a judgment against 
the Respondent for $5,970.00. (R. 558). The sum of $5,970.00 
reflects an amount the Respondent conceded was due. (R. 580). 
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and the issues it included, additional proceedings were held in the 
form of trial requests and pre-trials. (R.564, 566, 568, 581). On May 
8, 2000, the District Court engaged in a telephone conference with 
counsel and concluded that his decision on November 6,1998 
included all clam parties and that a final judgment and order 
order was entered oi i IIIIIM \\ 'mm ih' 586). 
Disposition In Court Below. The District Court sustained the 
Respondent's objection to Commissioner Arnett's recommended 
judgment of for $24,896.34 in arrearages, $2,552.88 in attorney's fees, 
and $68.92 in costs. The District Court based its decision on the 
premise that divorce decree regarding child support could be 
retroactively adjusted and that the Petitioner was equitably estopped 
trnm rlaiminq rh i l r l n ippnr l tnr i .rntn, n«i|nlr m 1111 111 < > I'lnsponiiiMil II 
entered an Amended Judgment & Order on only the conceded amount 
due, $5,970.10, without consideration of any other arguments or 
claims of the Petitioner. It rejected the Commissioner's 
recommendation to award fees and costs to the Petitioner. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were divorced on March 8, 1982. (Decree, R. 50). 
The Petitioner was awarded custody of the parties' two minor children, 
Kelly and Gentry. Kelly was born on April 19, 1978, and Gentry was 
born on November 24, 1979. (Affidavit of Petitioner, Par. 3, R. 502). 
Paragraph two of the Decree required the Respondent to pay child 
support in the amount of $300.00 per month. (Decree, R. 50). 
During the period of 1982 to 1988, the Petitioner was required to 
file numerous Motions for Orders to Show Cause in an effort to 
compel the Respondent to pay child support. For example, she filed 
an Order to Show Cause on delinquent support on 4/23/84 (R. 170) 
that resulted in a judgment of $1,800.00 on 5/14/84 (R. 217), on 
6/10/84 (R. 226) that resulted in a judgment of $3,000.00 on 8/14/84 
(R. 233), on 8/15/84 (R. 235) that resulted in a stipulation for judgment 
of $600.00 (R. 256), on 2/26/85(R. 267) that resulted in a judgment of 
$900.00 (R. 288), on 7/11/85 (R. 333) that resulted in a judgment of 
$1,400.00 on 8/26/85 (R. 346). Following the judgments the Petitioner 
was required to execute upon the Respondent's property to satisfy the 
judgments and sometimes the Respondent would bring himself 
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current. This pattern continued through 1988 when the Plaintiff was 
required to file another Motion for Order to Show Cause on 6/13/88 (R. 
390) and she received a judgment for $1,900.00 (R. 399). 
The Respondent then moved from Utah to Nevada in 1989. 
(Affidavit of Petitioner, Paragraph 7, R. 502). The Petitioner had very 
little contact with the Respondent and he continued to fail or refused to 
pay child support. |d. On February 15,1989, the Petitioner filed a 
Reciprocal Support Action and enlisted the services of the Office of 
District Attorney, State of Nevada, Clark County, Nevada. Id 
The Petitioner had remarried. (Id., Paragraph 8). In the spring 
of 1992, the Petitioner was pregnant and going through a divorce, jd 
In April, 1992, the Petitioner and Respondent agreed that Gentry could 
live with the Respondent in Nevada through the summer and the 
commencement of school, at which time the Respondent would return 
Gentry to the Petitioner.1 ]a\ 
'These facts are set forth in the Affidavit of the Petitioner in support of her Motion 
For Judgment. (R. 502). The Respondent did not file an affidavit contesting these facts. 
However, he filed an Affidavit of Gentry that suggested, from Gentry's point of view, he 
was given a choice to live with the Petitioner or the Respondent and he chose the 
Respondent. (R. 521). The Petitioner suggests, as argued infra, that Gentry's point of 
view is not material. 
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At the end of the summer, the Respondent refused to return 
Gentry to Petitioner. (Id., Paragraph 9). The Respondent threatened 
to arrest the Petitioner if she attempted to come and get Gentry in 
Nevada. Id. She lacked sufficient means to retrieve Gentry from the 
Respondent. jdL 
Kelly remained with the Petitioner. Kelly turned 18 on April 19, 
1996, and graduated in June, 1996. id 
The Petitioner filed the present Motion for Order to Show Cause 
on August 3,1996. (R. 402). The Respondent did not file an answer 
but filed a "Notice of Affirmative Defenses" that included the doctrines 
of laches, waiver and estoppel. (R. 412) 
On October 31,1996, the Respondent filed a Petition To Modify 
Decree seeking legal custody of Gentry and seeking child support. (R. 
415). It was served on the Petitioner on November 11, 1996. (R. 420). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Petitioner respectfully argues that Commissioner Thomas 
N. Arnett's recommended decision granting the Petitioner's Motion For 
Judgment should not have been rejected by the District Court. The 
District Court, Homer F. Wilkinson, erred as a matter of law in 
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accepting the Respondent's unsubstantiated argument of equitable 
estoppel and retroactively modifying the Decree of Divorce. Even if 
the principle of equitable estoppel was a viable theory in Utah in 
divorce actions, the facts in this case did not support the Respondent 
as a matter of law. And, even applying the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel, the District Court miscalculated the proper amount due. The 
Petitioner respectfully submits that she is entitled to a reinstatement of 
the Judgment & Order recommended by Commissioner Arnett and an 
award of additional fees and costs below as well as attorney's fees 
and costs incurred on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
Point One 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE 
COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDED DECISION GRANTING 
THE PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
A. Introduction. 
This case was initially set for trial on July 16,1998. (R. 478). 
On June 24,1998, the District Court struck the trial date and 
remanded the case to the Commissioner for a recommended 
decision. (R. 483). The District Court instructed counsel to prepare 
Thompson Appellate Brief*** page 11 
affidavits and memoranda regarding their relative positions for the 
Commissioner to make a recommended decision, jd. 
Thereafter, on July 23, 1998, the Petitioner filed her Motion For 
Judgment requesting that the Court enter a judgment for $24,896.34 
in past due child support, $2,552.88 in attorney's fees, and $68.92 in 
costs. The Motion was supported by the Petitioner's Affidavit (R. 502) 
and a detailed accounting concerning the arrearages. (R. 495). This 
accounting is attached as Exhibit A. 
The Petitioner's accounting reflected all of the relevant events 
and facts described in the Statement Of Facts, supra. The accounting 
covered the period of 7/1/88 to 7/31/98 and started with the judgment 
rendered in July 1988, in the amount of $1,900.00. It included all 
payments received by the Clark County District Attorney's Office from 
July, 1988 through July, 1998. 
The accounting took into consideration the fact that Kelly turned 
18 on April 19, 1996. (R. 495, 500 and footnote 4 to the accounting). 
The accounting did not deduct any child support for Gentry when 
he started living with the Respondent in April, 1992. As footnote 3 to 
the accounting indicates, providing any reduction for Gentry would 
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have been tantamount to an improper retroactive modification of a 
support order contained in a decree of divorce. (R. 495, 497). 
Instead, the accounting reflected, in footnotes 5 and 6, that an 
adjustment to child support could have been made as of the date the 
Petitioner was served with the Respondent's Petition To Modify 
Decree seeking custody of Gentry, and an order of support, on 
November 11,1996, in accordance with Utah's Civil Liability For 
Support Act. (R. 495, 500-501). The Respondent was granted credit 
of $309.20 per month commencing December, 1996, until Gentry 
turned 18 on 11/24/97. (R. 495, 501, footnote 7). Commissioner 
Arnett heard the Petitioner's Motion For Judgment on September 18, 
1998. (R. 526). The Respondent did not contest the accounting but 
instead argued that the Petitioner was equitably estopped from 
asserting child support for Gentry while living with the Respondent. 
The Respondent did not file an affidavit from himself contesting the 
Petitioner's facts but instead filed an affidavit from Gentry (R. 521) that 
suggested, from Gentry's point of view, that he was given the choice 
of residing with either party and chose to live with the Respondent in 
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1992. Commissioner Amett rejected the Respondent's argument of 
equitable estoppel and granted the Petitioner's Motion For Judgment. 
The Respondent filed an Objection To Commissioner's 
Recommendation. (R. 527). The Respondent did not file any further 
affidavits or submit any additional evidence relating to his theory of 
equitable estoppel. Instead, he argued that Commissioner Arnett 
erred in not recognizing the equitable estoppel theory in divorce cases 
and that the doctrine "should prevent Petitioner from collecting child 
support for a child she did not support." (R. 527, 530). The 
Respondent requested that the District Court reject the recommended 
judgment" and the matter be returned to the Commissioner for an 
evidentiary hearing whether Respondent meets the factual criteria for 
equitable estoppel." jcL 
The District Court heard the Respondent's objection on 
November 6,1998. There, the District Court sustained the 
Respondent's objection. The minute entry reflects, "The objection to 
the recommendation is argued before the court and the same is 
submitted. The court finds the objection is well taken and grants the 
same." (R. 552). The transcript of the hearing shows that the 
Thompson Appellate Brief *** page 14 
Respondent argued that the equitable estoppel theory should be 
applied for the period that Gentry was with Respondent. (T. p. 3-4). 
The Court ruled that the respondent's objection was well taken as to 
the time period the child was with his father. (T. p. 7). 
B. The Doctrine Of Equitable Estoppel Is Inapplicable 
In Cases Where A Valid Support Order Exists. 
The Petitioner argued before the District Court that the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel was inapplicable in cases having a prior support 
order as a matter of law. The District Court disagreed. This is a 
question that this Court reviews for correctness. Dent v. Dent, 870 
P.2d 280, 282 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
In 1987, the Utah Legislature enacted Section 30-3-10.6 U.C.A. 
(1953), as amended. Subsection (1) provides that "Each [child 
support] order...is, on and after the date it is due...(c) not subject to 
retroactive modification by this or any other jurisdiction, except as 
provided in Subsection (2)." Subsection 2 then provides that a child 
support order may be modified only "with respect to any period during 
which a petition for modification is pending, but only from the date 
notice of the petition was given to the obligee...." Since 1987, the 
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Utah Courts have been uniform that, in actions where a child support 
order has been issued, a child support order may not be retroactively 
modified. Cummings v. Cummings. 821 P.2d 472 (Ut. App. 1991); 
Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814 (Ut. App. Ct. 1992); Brooks v. 
Brooks. 881 P.2d 955 (Ut. App. 1994); Ball v. Peterson. 912 P.2d 
1006 (Ut. App. 1996); and, Brinkerhoff v. Brinkerhoff. 945 P.2d 113 
(Ut. App. 1997). Even prior to the enactment of Section 30-3-10.6, 
Utah Court's were loath to retroactively modify a child support order. 
Stettler v. Stettler. 713 P.2d 699 (Utah 1985); and, Karren v. State 
Department Of Social Services. 716 P.2d 810 (Utah 1986). 
And, indeed, the rule against retroactive modifications of support 
orders applies even where an obligor has the actual physical custody 
of children and is required to pay support for that child. In Stettler v. 
Stettler. supra, a mother had the actual physical custody of a 
daughter, after the parties' stipulated for a transfer of custody, during a 
period of time that the original decree required the mother to pay 
support for her daughter. The parties did not alter the original 
decree's requirement that the mother pay child support for the 
daughter. The lower Court enforced the support order in the original 
Thompson Appellate Brief *** page 16 
decree and entered a stipulated judgment of past due child support 
against her for that same time period notwithstanding the fact she had 
actual physical custody. She asked on "equitable grounds alone" for a 
retroactive judgment for child support from the father for that same 
time period but the District Court rejected her request. Id., p. 702-703. 
The Trial Court's decision was affirmed on appeal. 
The decision in Stettler, supra, was upheld in Karren v. State 
Department Of Social Services, supra. In Karren, the father was 
awarded custody of two children and the mother was awarded custody 
of one in 1972. The father was ordered initially to pay the mother child 
support for the one child but that order was later modified abating his 
obligation to pay her support. By 1976, all three children resided with 
the father and he received public assistance. The State Department 
of Social Services, by assignment, sought a judgment retroactively 
against the mother on behalf of the father. The Supreme Court 
rejected the State's request: 
"In the present case, as in Stettler, a valid court order existed 
setting forth support obligations regarding plaintiff's children. 
Though either party could have sought a modification of that 
order when physical custody of the children changed, neither 
attempted to modify the decree. Thus, under the holding in 
Stettler, plaintiff's former husband would be barred from 
Thompson Appellate Brief*** page 17 
obtaining support from plaintiff retroactively for periods in which 
he had custody." 
Karren v. State Department Of Social Services, supra, p. 812. The 
Utah Supreme Court in Karren also upheld the ruling of Larsen v. 
Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077 (1977) that a retroactive modification of a child 
support order was never appropriate "no matter what the 
circumstances may have been since the divorce decree." ]cL The 
Supreme Court stated, "Thus, only prospective modification of a 
support obligation is proper." id, 
Utah's statute, Section 30-3-10.6, and the above decisions 
make sense. A retroactive modification of a support order would 
violate principles of due process. In addition, it would be impossible to 
apply under the present child-support system. One would need the 
financial information of the parties as of the date the retroactive 
application would be made in order to calculate the proper child 
support. Then, if the financial conditions changed during the 
retroactive period in question, would one party or another have the 
right to another adjustment during the period in question? 
Thompson Appellate Brief*** page 18 
In the present case, the Respondent's ultimate argument is that 
he is entitled to a retroactive adjustment of child support for Gentry 
going back to April, 1992, when he obtained his actual custody. He 
never sought a modification of the Decree of Divorce in this matter 
seeking either custody or a child support order. Even if a retroactive 
adjustment were possible in principle, it would be impossible to apply 
given Utah's child support calculation system under Utah's Uniform 
Civil Liability For Support Act. And, indeed, it very well could be 
possible that the Respondent still would have owed the Petitioner for 
support, given a split custody arrangement, and given his high income 
during that period of time as compared to Respondent's. 
The Petitioner respectfully submits that the District Court erred 
in considering equitable estoppel in this case. The District Court's 
ruling violated Section 30-3-10.6 and the cases sited above. 
C. The District Court Erred In Finding That 
Respondent Proved The Elements Of Equitable 
Estoppel Assuming The Doctrine Were Available. 
The District Court's finding that the Plaintiff was equitably 
estopped from claiming child support for Gentry was wrong as a 
matter of law even assuming that the doctrine was available to the 
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Respondent. The question of whether equitable estoppel has been 
proven is a mixed question of fact and law. State Department Of 
Human Services v. Irizarrv, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (1997). 
In Irizarrv, a paternity case involving "reimbursement" of child 
care expenses instead of child support, where no prior order of child 
support was involved, the Utah Supreme Court held that a party may 
be equitably estopped from claiming reimbursement for child care 
expenses. It ruled that a party must prove the following elements in 
order to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) an admission, 
statement or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted; (2) 
action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement, or 
act; and, (3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first 
party to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act. 
Irizarrv, supra, p. 680. 
In the present case, the Respondent demonstrated none of the 
elements. The only affidavit submitted by the Respondent was that of 
Gentry who stated, from his point of view, that he was given a choice 
to live with his mother or father and he decided on the latter. (R. 521). 
His affidavit showed that he continued to live with his father until 
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1998. ]d. Although he states that he visited with the Petitioner in Salt 
Lake, Gentry fails to identify when he did so. lg\ Gentry's affidavit is 
immaterial concerning what the parties "agreed" to do with Gentry in 
April, 1992, and is immaterial to the Petitioner's affidavit testimony that 
the Respondent refused to return Gentry when school was to start in 
the fall of 1992. 
The Respondent did not file an affidavit contradicting the 
Petitioner's version of what happened in 1992. Her Affidavit, stating 
that Gentry temporarily went to live with the Respondent in April, 1992, 
while she was going through a divorce, is uncontradicted. (R. 502, 
504, Paragraph 8). Her Affidavit, stating that the Respondent refused 
to return Gentry, and threatened to arrest her if she tried to obtain him, 
is also uncontradicted. ig\ 
Gentry did indeed live with the Respondent from April, 1992, 
until he turned 18. The mere fact that Gentry resided with the 
Respondent is not sufficient to invoke equitable estoppel as a matter 
of law. Cummings v. Cummings, supra; Stettler v. Stettler, supra; 
and, Karren v. State Department Of Social Services, supra. 
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The Respondent's facts do not establish equitable estoppel, as 
found by the District Court, as a matter of law. The District Court erred 
in finding equitable estoppel based on these facts. There is nothing in 
the record that suggests the Petitioner made an admission, statement 
or act inconsistent with her claim of custody over Gentry. 
Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that the 
Respondent reasonably changed his position in reliance on the 
Petitioner's representations to his detriment. Irizzarv, supra, p. 680. 
One must ask, how did the Respondent change his position in reliance 
on some unidentified representation of the Petitioner if such were 
made. Here, the undisputed evidence is that the Respondent had not 
paid the Petitioner any child support for the period of 12/90 through 
12/92, until the State Of Nevada commenced garnishment 
proceedings. See Exhibit A, attached. He was $12,251.00 in arrears 
in April, 1992. The Respondent failed to pay child support for either 
child before Gentry commenced living with him and failed to pay it 
after. So, how did the Respondent's position change? Had the 
evidence shown he had been faithfully paying the required $300.00 
per month in child support until April, 1992, then $150.00 thereafter, 
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one could determine his position may have changed. But those facts 
are not present in this case. Here, the Respondent did nothing to 
change his position. As stated in Bagqs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 
144 (Utah 1974), detrimental reliance is not established "by the mere 
fact he indulged in pleasant and euphoric assumption that he would 
not have to meet his obligations...." The mere passage of time, or the 
failure of the Petitioner to hound him like a creditor, does not create an 
estoppel. Id. 
The Petitioner respectfully submits that the District Court erred 
as a matter of law when it decided that the Respondent had proved 
the elements of equitable estoppel. 
D. The District Court Erred In Calculating The Judgment 
Assuming The Doctrine Of Equitable Estoppel Was 
Available And That The Respondent Proved Its Elements. 
The District Court struck the judgment recommended by 
Commissioner Arnett and substituted a judgment of $5,970.00. (R. 
586). Further, the District Court rejected the Commissioner's 
recommendation for attorney's fees and costs, id. 
The Respondent never submitted any accounting of what he 
believed was due. The figure of $5,970.00 was based on an amount 
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that the Respondent "conceded" was due. (R. 577, 580). The District 
Court merely adopted the figure without verification and despite the 
Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing on the matter. (Id., and 
R. 560, 566, 568). 
The District Court erred as a matter of law. Even if one were to 
deduct the sum of $150.00 for the period of 4/92 through 11/24/97, 
when Gentry turned 18, the sum to be deducted from the judgment 
recommended by Commissioner Arnett should have been $9,900.00 
(66 X $150.00)2. Without considering a corresponding adjustment of 
accrued interest, the recommended judgment should have been 
$14,996.34 ($24,896.34-$9,990.00=$14,996.34). In addition, there 
was no basis for withholding attorney's fees and costs. 
Point Two 
THE PETITIONER SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS BELOW AND ON APPEAL 
Commissioner Arnett recommended that the Petitioner be 
awarded attorney's fees and costs as part of the Judgment & Order. 
2This assumes, of course, that the proper sum to be deducted would be $150.00. 
This figure is not correct. Had the parties modified the Decree of Divorce in April, 1992, 
they would have been required to use a split custody worksheet under Utah's Uniform 
Civil Liability For Support Act and the figure would have been different. 
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(R. 545). As of July 17, 1998, those fees were $2,552.88 and the 
costs were $68.92. (R. 507 and 511). Thereafter, the Respondent 
objected to Commissioner Arnett's recommendation and the District 
Court did not include any fees and costs in its Amended Judgment 
And Order. (R. 586). In the event the Appellate Court concludes that 
the District Court erred in rejecting Commissioner Arnett's 
recommended decision, Judgment & Order, the Petitioner respectfully 
submits that she would be entitled to additional fees incurred by 
reason of the Respondent's objection, or after July 17,1998. 
Also, in the event that the Petitioner prevails on appeal 
concerning a main issue, she requests that the Appellate Court award 
her attorney's fees and costs on appeal. Marshall v. Marshall, 915 
P.2d 508, 517 (Ut. App. 1996) and Childs v. Childs. 967 P.2d 942 (Ut. 
App. 1998), cert den, 982 P.2d 88 (1999). 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Petitioner respectfully submits that the District Court erred 
by rejecting Commissioner Arnett's recommended Judgment And 
Order. The Petitioner requests that the Judgment & Order (R. 545) be 
reinstated and that she be awarded the full amount of $24,896.34 plus 
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interest accruing thereon. She requests that the Appellate Court grant 
her a further award of attorney's fees and costs arising after July 17, 
1998, when the Respondent filed his objection to Commissioner 
Arnett's recommended decision, as well as her fees and costs on 
appeal. She requests that this Court remand with appropriate 
instructions to implement Commissioner Arnett's recommended 
Judgment & Order and to determine any additional fees and costs 
incurred after July 17,1998 including those on appeal. 
ADDENDUM 
Child Support Arrearage Calculation - Exhibit A 
DATED this^ v day of November, 2000. 
STEPHEN W. COOK 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
STEPHEN W. COOK, being duly sworn, says: 
That he is the attorney for Petitioner herein; and that he served 
the APPELLANT'S BRIEF upon: 
James A. Mclntyre 
MclNTRYE & GOLDEN, L.C. 
360 East 4500 South, Suite 3 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and 
depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, 
in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on the -€> day of 
November, 2000. 
STEPHEN W. COOK 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7y day of November, 
2000. 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A 
CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGE CALCULATIONS 
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Exhibit A 
CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGE CALCULATIONS 
Arrearages Balance on Laura Thompson v Thompson, Civil No 814901295 
Our File 12496 
From 7/1/88 to 7/31/98 
Date Child Supp Due Alimony Due Amt Paid Interest Due1 Balance Due2 
1 7/88 
1 8/88 
1 9/88 
| 10/88 
1 11/88 
J 12/88 
1 1/89 
1 2/89 
3/89 
4/89 
5/89 
6/89 
7/89 
8/89 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
400 00 
400 00 
0 00 
800 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
400 00 
0 00 
0 00 
400 00 
400 00 
400 00 
0 
o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
384 
0 
0 
1800 00 
1700 
2000 
1500 
1800 
2100 
2400 
2700 
2600 
2900 | 
3200 1 
3484 | 
3384 J 
3284 | 
interest on monthly child support payments is provided by Section 30-3-10 6 U C A 
(1953), as amended Interest is calculated under Section 15-1-4 pursuant to the statute applicable 
at the time 12% prior to May, 1993, 5 72% from May to December, 1993, 5 61% from January 
through December, 1994, 9 22% from January through December 1995, 7 35% from January 
through December, 1996, 7 45% from January, 1997 through December, 1997, and 7 468% from 
January through the present The District Court has no discretion to lower, stay, or waive 
interest Stroud v Stroud. 738 P 2d 649 (Utah App 1987), affd., 758 P 2d 905 (1988). 
2On June 30, 1988, the Court entered an Order entering judgement against the Defendant 
for the sum of $1,900 for past due child support and ordering that the Defendant pay $100 00 per 
month toward arrearages in addition to his ongoing support obligation 
1 9/89 
J 10/89 
1 11/89 
| 12/89 
1 1/90 
1 2/90 
1 3/90 
1 4/90 
1 5/90 
1 6/90 
1 7/90 
1 8/90 
1 9/90 
J 10/90 
| 11/90 
1 12/90 
1 1/91 
1 2/91 
3/91 
4/91 
5/91 | 
6/91 | 
7/91 1 
8/91 1 
9/91 1 
10/91 | 
11/91 | 
12/91 | 
J 300 00 
J 300 00 
1 300 00 
1 300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 
300 00 1 
300 00 1 
300 00 1 
300 00 | 
300 00 | 
300 00 | 
J 0 00 
1 ooo 
| 0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
ooo 1 
0 00 | 
0 00 | 
ooo 1 
ooo 1 
ooo 1 
ooo 1 
ooo 1 
ooo 1 
0 00 [ 
0 00 
350 00 
350 00 
0 00 
350 00 
0 00 
0 00 
700 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
175 00 
175 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
1 ° 
1 ° 
1° 
1 ° 
1° 
0 
0 
0 
0 
508 08 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
959 0496 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
_0 
1 3584 
1 3534 
1 3484 
1 3784 
3734 1 
4034 1 
4334 J 
3934 1 
4234 1 
5042 08 J 
5342 08 1 
5642 08 1 
5942 08 J 
6067 08 | 
6192 08 J 
6492 08 J 
6792 08 1 
7092 08 1 
7392 08 1 
7692 08 1 
7992 08 1 
9251 1296 1 
9551 1296 J 
9851 1296 J 
10151 1296 1 
10451 1296 1 
10751 1296 1 
11051 1296 1 
1 1/92 
1 2/92 
j 3/92 
| 4/92 
1 5/92 
| 6/92 
1 7/92 
1 8/92 
1 9/92 
1 10/92 
1 11/92 
1 12/92 
1 12/92 
J 12/92 
1 1/93 
1 2/93 
1 2/93 
1 2/93 
3/93 1 
4/93 1 
5/93 | 
5/93 j 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.003 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
300.00 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
0.00 
J 0.00 
| 0.00 
1 o.oo 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 j 
138.46 
138.46 J 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1506.136 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1952.72 
11351.1296 
11651.1296 
11951.1296 
12251.1296 
12551.1296 
14357.26515 
14657.26515 
14957.26515 
15257.26515 
15557.26515 
15857.26515 
16018.80515 | 
15880.34515 | 
15741.88515 | 
15903.42515 | 
16064.96515 | 
15926.50515 | 
15788.04515 | 
15949.58515 | 
16111.12515 1 
16272.66515 | 
18086.92497 | 
3Gentry went to visit with the Respondent in April 1992 and was not returned following 
this visit. Respondent claims that his child support should be reduced to $150.00 per month 
because of this fact. Petitioner claims that the Court is prohibited from granting a retroactive 
modification and a modification may only be granted when a petition to modify has been filed and 
the Petitioner has been provided notice. Section 30-3-10.6 U.C.A (1953), as amended; Ball v. 
Peterson. 912 P.2d 1006, 1011 (Utah App. 1996). In this case the Respondent's Petition was 
filed on 10/22/96 and served on 11/11/96. 
n 0 d Q 7 
1 6/93 
J 6/93 
1 6/93 
1 7/93 
J 7/93 
J 8/93 
| 8/93 
J 9/93 
| 9/93 
1 10/93 
1 10/93 
1 10/93 
1 10/93 
| 11/93 
11/93 
11/93 
12/93 1 
12/93 1 
12/93 | 
1/94 1 
1/94 1 
2/94 J 
2/94 | 
2/94 | 
3/94 1 
3/94 1 
4/94 J 
4/94 1 
J 300.00 
J 0.00 
1 o.oo 
300.00 
0.00 
300.00 
0.00 
300.00 
0.00 
300.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
0.00 
300.00 1 
o.oo 1 
o.oo 1 
300.00 1 
o.oo 1 
300.00 1 
0.00 | 
1 o.oo 
1 o.oo 
1 o.oo 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
o.oo 1 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
| 138.46 
1 138.46 
1 138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
73.08 
65.38 
138.46 
65.38 
65.38 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
23.08 
115.38 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
73.08 
65.38 
1 ° 
1 ° 
1 ° 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1292.845 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
_0 
1 18248.46497 
1 18110.00497 
1 17971.54497 J 
1 18133.08497 
17994.62497 
18156.16497 | 
18017.70497 | 
18179.24497 | 
18040.78497 | 
18202.32497 | 
18063.86497 | 
17990.78497 | 
17925.40497 | 
18086.94497 | 
18021.56497 | 
17956.18497 | 
19410.57029 | 
19272.11029 1 
19133.65029 | 
19295.19029 | 
19272.11029 1 
19456.73029 | 
19318.27029 | 
19179.81029 1 
19341.35029 | 
19202.89029 | 
19429.81029 | 
19364.43029 | 
1 4/94 
1 5/94 
1 5/94 
1 6/94 
1 6/94 
1 7/94 
J 7/94 
1 8/94 
1 8/94 
1 9/94 
J 9/94 
1 9/94 
J 9/94 
J 9/94 
J 10/94 
J 10/94 
| 10/94 
1 10/94 
1 11/94 
J 11/94 
J 11/94 
1 12/94 
1 12/94 
1 12/94 
1/95 
1/95 J 
2/95 1 
2/95 1 
1 o.oo 
I 300.00 
J 0.00 
1 300.00 
0.00 
300.00 
0.00 
300.00 
0.00 
300.00 
! 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
0.00 
300.00 
0.00 
1 o.oo 
1 o.oo 
| 0.00 
1 o.oo 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
| 150.00 
1 150.00 
1 150.00 
150.00 
150.00 
150.00 
150.00 
! 150.00 
150.00 
69.23 
69.23 
69.23 
69.23 
69.23 
69.23 
69.23 
69.23 
69.23 
69.23 
69.23 
69.23 
138.46 
69.23 
138.46 
138.46 
138.46 
69.23 
138.46 1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 
0 
0 
0 
1086.992 
0 
0 
0 
0 | 
19214.43029 
19364.43029 
19214.43029 
19364.43029 
19214.43029 
19364.43029 
19214.43029 
19364.43029 | 
19214.43029 | 
19445.20029 | 
19375.97029 | 
19306.74029 | 
19237.51029 | 
19168.28029 | 
19399.05029 | 
19329.82029 | 
19260.59029 | 
19191.36029 J 
19422.13029 | 
19352.90029 | 
19283.67029 | 
19445.21029 | 
19375.98029 | 
20324.51278 | 
20486.05278 | 
20347.59278 | 
20578.36278 | 
20439.90278 | 
no A n n 
1 2/95 
1 3/95 
1 4/95 
J 5/95 
1 6/95 
1 7/95 
J 8/95 
| 9/95 
1 10/95 
1 11/95 
1 12/95 
1 1/96 
1 2/96 
1 3/96 
4/96 
5/96 
6/96 
7/96 
8/96 
9/96 
10/96 
11/96 
| 0.00 
1 300.00 
1 300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
300.00 
150.004 
150.00 
150.00 | 
150.00 1 
150.00 1 
150.005 _ | 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
138.46 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
600.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
900.00 
0.00 
0.00 
600.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
900.00 
0.00 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2037.753 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 J 
20301.44278 
20601.44278 
20901.44278 
20901.44278 
20601.44278 
20901.44278 | 
21201.44278 | 
21501.44278 | 
21801.44278 | 
22101.44278 | 
24439.19581 | 
24739.19581 | 
24739.19581 | 
24139.19581 | 
24439.19581 | 
24739.19581 | 
24289.19581 | 
24439.19581 | 
24589.19581 | 
24739.19581 | 
23989.19581 | 
24139.19581 J 
4Kelly turned 18 on 4/19/96 and graduated in June, 1996 
Petition by Respondent filed 10/22/96 and served on 11/11/96. 
1 12/96 
1 1/97 
J 2/97 
| 3/97 
1 4/97 
J 5/97 
1 6/97 
1 7/97 
J 8/97 
| 9/97 
| 10/97 
1 11/97 
1 12/97 
J 1/98 
1 2/98 
| 3/98 
| 4/98 
| 5/98 
6/98 
7/98 
J -309.206 
1 -309.20 
1 -309.20 
-309.20 
-309.20 
-309.20 
-309.20 
-309.20 
-309.20 
-309.20 
-309.20 
-309.307 
00.00 
0.00 
0.00 
TOTALS 1 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
16888.38 
1774.231 
0 
0 
0 
o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1654.118 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 
0 
1039.292 
25604.2267 
25295.0267 
24985.8267 
24676.6267 
24367.4267 
24058.2267 
23749.0267 
23439.8267 
23130.6267 
22821.4267 
22512.2267 
22202.9267 
23857.04474 
23857.04474 | 
23857.04474 | 
23857.04474 | 
23857.04474 | 
23857.04474 | 
23857.04474 | 
23857.04474 | 
24896.33713 | 
G:\WP\CLIENTS\THOMPSON\OTHER\ACCOUNT.THR 
6Assuming the Court would grant the Respondent's Petition to Modify, and assuming 
further that the Court would grant the Respondent child support retroactive to the date of service 
of process upon the Petitioner, Petitioner's child support obligation for Gentry begins at $334.00 
less $24.80 for health care costs. 
7Gentry turned 18 on 11/24/97 and Plaintiffs support obligation terminates. 
